Managing Cyber Risk in Energy Infrastructure

Power grids, pipelines, and refineries used to be protected mainly by fences and guards. Now, the biggest threats often arrive quietly through network connections and software updates. In 2024, the energy sector recorded 1,120 ransomware attacks, a 95 percent increase from 2018, according to research summarized by Scottmax. That growth in attacks is forcing energy operators to treat cyber risk as a core part of operational safety, not just an IT issue.

That shift is not theoretical. In the same period, analysts tracked 15 major cyber incidents against energy companies worldwide, marking a new annual record according to S&P Global research. Each event carried the potential to disrupt fuel supply, damage equipment, or trigger cascading failures across regions. Boards and regulators now ask very direct questions about cyber readiness, and vague answers are no longer acceptable.

Managing this risk starts with understanding how attackers see energy infrastructure, where the most critical weak points sit, and which protections actually reduce the chance and impact of a successful breach. It also requires practical ways to work with vendors, empower engineers, and prepare operating teams to respond under pressure.

Energy companies operate in a threat environment that looks very different from even a few years ago. Production networks and control systems are now deeply connected to corporate IT, cloud services, and partner platforms. This connectivity supports efficiency and visibility, but it also gives adversaries more paths into plants, substations, and field assets.

A recent study found that 62 percent of critical infrastructure operators in the United States and United Kingdom were targeted by cyberattacks in the past year, and 80 percent of those organizations were attacked multiple times, according to research highlighted by Semperis. That constant probing shows that energy infrastructure is now treated as a standing target, not an occasional victim. Attackers are patient, well funded, and willing to blend criminal motives with geopolitical goals.

Specialists in industrial control systems are seeing the same pattern. Experts quoted by ARC Advisory Group note that the dramatic spike in operational technology and industrial control system incidents calls for immediate action to improve cybersecurity posture, or organizations risk becoming the next victim of a breach, as reported by Industrial Cyber. For energy operators, that means treating cyber events as a matter of reliability and safety, on par with mechanical failures or physical intrusions.

Adversaries focus on energy infrastructure because it is both essential and exposed. Electrical grids, gas networks, and oil supply chains keep economies running. A successful disruption can create financial damage far beyond the attacked company. That leverage makes energy assets attractive for ransomware gangs and for state-aligned groups trying to create political pressure.

At the same time, many operational environments still rely on legacy equipment that was never designed for internet connectivity. Control systems that once sat safely behind isolated walls now share networks with enterprise systems, remote maintenance tools, and cloud analytics platforms. Every new connection adds convenience and value, but also a potential entry point for attackers.

Complex Supply Chains and Vendor Risk

The modern energy business depends heavily on third parties. Software vendors manage key applications, integrators link equipment from different eras, and specialized service providers remotely monitor field devices. Each of those partners often requires some level of network or system access, which can quietly expand the attack surface.

SecurityScorecard has reported that in 2024, 67 percent of energy sector breaches were linked to software and IT vendors, reinforcing the idea that security is only as strong as the weakest supplier connection, as detailed in a SecurityScorecard report. When an attacker compromises a vendor, that foothold can be used to move quietly into multiple customer environments at once. Energy organizations that once focused mainly on their own firewalls and passwords now need a disciplined approach to vendor selection, access control, and ongoing third party monitoring.

Operational Technology and ICS Weak Spots

Operational technology and industrial control systems manage physical processes such as turbine speeds, valve positions, and relay settings. Many of these systems were designed with safety and availability as top priorities, while cyber threats were barely considered. As a result, they may lack modern security features, rely on default credentials, or run outdated software that is difficult to patch without planning outages.

Attackers understand these constraints. They know that operators are reluctant to take down critical systems for maintenance, and that engineering teams may have limited time and staff to test complex updates. By moving from IT networks into OT zones, adversaries aim to reach points where even small changes can disrupt production or damage equipment. Effective cyber risk management in energy infrastructure must therefore account for the unique limitations and stakes of OT environments, not just traditional IT.

No two energy companies face exactly the same set of cyber risks. A transmission operator that runs a high voltage grid, a regional gas distributor, and a large refinery will each have different critical assets, regulatory obligations, and attacker profiles. Yet there is value in mapping risk across the entire value chain, from resource extraction to retail delivery.

Generation assets might worry most about sabotage of turbines or generators, while midstream operators focus on pipeline monitoring and leak detection systems. Transmission and distribution companies prioritize grid stability and the integrity of protection relays. Trading desks and market operations care deeply about data integrity and system availability. A structured risk assessment should identify where compromise would cause the most damage, then trace how an attacker could realistically reach those systems.

This exercise works best when cyber teams and engineers collaborate closely. Engineers bring practical knowledge of plant processes, failure modes, and safety margins. Cyber practitioners contribute threat intelligence, attack path analysis, and control frameworks. When those perspectives are combined, organizations can move beyond generic risk labels and start prioritizing protections around specific, high impact scenarios.

A strong cyber program in energy infrastructure does not start with buying tools. It starts with clarity about risk, roles, and priorities. Senior leadership needs to define what level of cyber risk is acceptable, which services must remain available even during an attack, and how tradeoffs between security and operational continuity will be handled.

From there, organizations can establish governance structures that connect cyber decision making to operations, safety, and finance. Many companies create cross functional committees that include cybersecurity leaders, OT engineers, compliance staff, and business unit heads. These groups review risk assessments, approve major changes, and track progress against security roadmaps. When decisions are shared in this way, cyber risk management becomes part of how the business runs, not an isolated IT project.

It is also important to recognize that cyber threats and business models both change over time. Risk assessments, security architectures, and incident playbooks should be treated as living documents. Regular reviews after major projects, regulatory updates, or observed attacks keep the program relevant and realistic.

Foundational Controls for IT and OT

While every environment is different, a set of core controls consistently reduces cyber risk across energy operations. Asset inventory and configuration management sit at the top of that list. An organization cannot protect what it cannot see, and in many plants or grid control centers, equipment has been added or modified over years without a current, centralized record.

Network segmentation is another foundational control. Separating corporate IT from control networks, and then further segmenting OT zones based on criticality and function, limits how far an attacker can move after an initial compromise. Combined with strong access control, multi factor authentication where possible, and strict management of remote access, segmentation can turn a single foothold into a contained incident instead of a system wide crisis.

Spending on these controls is rising as energy companies modernize their defenses. Analysts expect the global cybersecurity market for the energy sector to reach 17.2 billion dollars by 2030, growing at an average annual rate of 9.5 percent from 2024 through 2030, according to Global Industry Analysts. That investment only delivers real value when it is aligned to specific risks and coupled with the basics of good hygiene, monitoring, and incident preparation.

Incident Response and Resilience

No matter how strong the defenses, energy organizations need to assume that some attacks will succeed. Incident response in this sector has to account for both digital containment and physical safety. A decision to isolate a compromised network segment may interrupt data flows that operators rely on for situational awareness, so plans must anticipate how to maintain safe operations while systems are partially blind or degraded.

Effective response planning begins with clear roles and communication paths. Cyber teams, control room staff, field crews, and executive leadership need to know who makes which decisions, and how information will be shared during fast moving events. Playbooks should outline specific steps for scenarios such as ransomware in corporate IT, suspected compromise of an engineering workstation, or manipulation of process data.

Exercises are critical. Tabletop sessions let teams walk through scenarios in a low pressure setting, uncovering gaps in procedures and assumptions. Technical drills can validate that backups actually restore, that failover systems operate as expected, and that manual workarounds are understood. Lessons from real incidents in the sector, such as those documented by industry analysts, should be folded into each new round of planning.

Energy companies often rely on long term relationships with equipment manufacturers, maintenance providers, and software suppliers. These partners bring deep expertise that operators need, but their access to systems must be carefully managed to avoid becoming an easy route for attackers.

The starting point is visibility into who has access to what. Vendor accounts, remote connections, and shared credentials should be inventoried and periodically reviewed. Where possible, vendors should connect through controlled gateways that enforce strong authentication, logging, and time limited access. Shared accounts and always on connections are high risk patterns that deserve special attention.

Contracts and service level agreements can also play a role. Security expectations around patching, vulnerability disclosure, incident notification, and data handling should be written into vendor agreements. That documentation gives both sides a clear understanding of responsibilities and provides leverage when rapid cooperation is required during a cyber incident. When paired with ongoing assessments and trust but verify monitoring, vendor relationships can support reliability without opening unnecessary doors to attackers.

Technical controls only go so far without committed leadership and a healthy security culture. Boards and executives set the tone by how they talk about cyber risk, which questions they ask, and how they reward or punish behavior related to security. When leaders treat cybersecurity as a compliance checkbox, staff will tend to do the bare minimum. When they frame it as integral to safety and reliability, teams are much more likely to engage.

Front line operators and engineers need clear, practical guidance rather than abstract policies. Training that uses real incidents and plant specific examples is far more effective than generic slide decks. When staff see how phishing emails, portable media, or unauthorized changes could realistically impact their facility, they start to internalize why certain controls matter.

Investment decisions should also reflect the reality that cyber risk is never fully eliminated. Some projects will reduce the likelihood of an incident, others will limit the blast radius, and some will improve the speed and quality of response. A balanced portfolio often delivers better resilience than concentrating budget in a single area, even if that area is trendy or highly visible.

Turning Compliance Into Competitive Advantage

Regulated parts of the energy sector already operate under detailed cybersecurity standards. These requirements can feel burdensome, especially for organizations that are still catching up. Yet compliance programs can also serve as a strong foundation for broader risk management if they are approached as a minimum baseline rather than an end goal.

Companies that treat regulatory controls as an opportunity to standardize processes, simplify architectures, and invest in shared platforms often discover side benefits. Incident investigations become faster because logs are centralized and consistent. Vendor reviews become smoother because expectations are clear and documented. Over time, a mature, well integrated security program can even become a competitive differentiator when customers, partners, or investors evaluate the reliability of an energy provider.

Bringing construction and operational programs into a single strategic view helps avoid pitfalls such as gaps at handover, mismatched definitions of insured property, or inconsistent treatment of defects. Some developers run joint workshops with contractors, OEMs, and brokers early in the project to align expectations about responsibilities and documentation. That investment tends to pay off when the first significant claim arises.

Leaders in energy organizations often ask similar questions when they start looking seriously at cyber risk. The answers rarely involve buying a single product or hiring a single specialist. They tend to revolve around governance, culture, and practical steps that connect cyber priorities to real operations.

The following questions capture common concerns from executives, plant managers, and security teams. The responses are intended as directional guidance that can support internal planning and deeper discussions with trusted advisors who understand the specific systems and regulatory context of each organization.

Which part of an energy company should own cyber risk?

Ultimate accountability usually sits with the executive team and the board, because cyber incidents can affect safety, revenue, and reputation. Day to day responsibility is often shared between a chief information security officer, OT or engineering leadership, and business unit heads who operate critical assets. Clear roles and shared decision forums help align these groups.

How can operators balance uptime with the need to patch OT systems?

The key is planning and prioritization. High risk vulnerabilities on critical systems may justify scheduled outages or targeted maintenance windows, while lower risk issues can wait for existing shutdown periods. Rigorous testing, staged deployment, and strong rollback plans help reduce the fear that patches will disrupt operations.

Do small regional utilities or operators really need sophisticated cyber programs?

Attackers do not limit themselves to large national companies. Smaller utilities and operators often have fewer resources and may be seen as easier targets, especially through vendor connections. A scaled program that focuses on the most important assets, basic hygiene, and simple incident response can still significantly reduce risk.

What should be the first step after discovering a suspected cyber incident?

The first priority is safety. Operators should confirm that critical processes remain within safe limits and that protective systems are functioning properly. In parallel, a pre defined incident response plan should be activated, bringing together cyber teams, operations staff, and leadership to assess scope, contain the issue, and communicate with regulators or partners as needed.

How often should energy organizations run cyber drills?



Many organizations find value in running tabletop exercises at least a few times each year, with more focused technical drills for specific teams. The exact frequency matters less than the quality of the scenarios, the diversity of participants, and the commitment to capturing and acting on lessons learned.

Energy infrastructure faces sustained and growing cyber pressure, from ransomware crews to highly capable state aligned actors. Studies and incident reports across the sector show how often critical operators are probed and how rapidly attackers adapt, as highlighted in recent research on critical infrastructure threats. Treating cybersecurity as a narrow IT problem underestimates both the stakes and the complexity involved.

Leaders who make progress typically do a few things consistently. They anchor cyber decisions in operational reality, work closely with engineers and vendors, and invest in foundational controls before chasing advanced tools. They also insist on realistic incident planning and regular practice, so teams can respond calmly when something goes wrong. With that mindset, managing cyber risk in energy infrastructure becomes an ongoing discipline that strengthens reliability, safety, and trust over time.